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Irreversible and Catastrophic
Cass R. Sunstein*

Abstract
As many treaties and statutes emphasize, some risks are distinctive in the sense
that they are potentially irreversible or catastrophic; for such risks, it is sensible to take
extra precautions. When a harm is irreversible, and when regulators lack information
about its magnitude and likelihood, they should purchase an “option” to prevent the
harm at a later date—the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle. This principle
brings standard option theory to bear on environmental law and risk regulation. And
when catastrophic outcomes are possible, it makes sense to take special precautions
against the worst-case scenarios—the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle. This
principle is based on three foundations: an emphasis on people’s occasional failure to
appreciate the expected value of truly catastrophic losses; a recognition that political
actors may engage in unjustifiable delay when the costs of precautions would be incurred
immediately and when the benefits would not be enjoyed until the distant future; and an
understanding of the distinction between risk and uncertainty. The normative arguments
are illustrated throughout with reference to the problem of global warming; other
applications include injunctions in environmental cases, genetic modification of food,
protection of endangered species, and terrorism.

Many losses are irreversible. Once a species is gone, it is gone forever.
Transgenic crops can impose irreversible costs as a result of increasing pest resistance.1
Because some greenhouse gases stay in the atmosphere for centuries, the problem of
global warming may be irreversible, at least for all practical purposes. Global warming
could be catastrophic as well, potentially endangering many millions of people.2
*

Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago, Law
School and Department of Political Science. I am extremely grateful to Robert Goodin, Robert Hahn, Eric
Posner, Richard Posner, Adrian Vermeule, and David Weisbach, and participants in a workshop at
Columbia Law School for valuable comments; special thanks to Vermeule and Weisbach for many helpful
discussions.
1
See Justus Wesseler, Resistance Economics of Transgenic Crops under Uncertainty: A Real Options
Approach, in Battling Resistance to Antibiotics and Pesticides 214 (Rmanan Lazminarayan ed. 2003); to
the same general effect, see Benoit Morel et al., Pesticide Resistance to Bt Corn: Real Option and Rational
Option Approaches to Decisionmaking, in id. at 184.
2
See Richard Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Response 43-58 (2004).

Irreversible or catastrophic risks pose distinctive problems for regulators; they require
significant adjustments in the standard forms of cost-benefit analysis.3 In any case
specialists in risk perception have long emphasized the fact that under some
circumstances, people are especially averse to risks that are irreversible, potentially
catastrophic, or both.4
The Precautionary Principle, used in many international documents,5 is often said
to have a special place in the context of irreversibility and catastrophe.6 Consider a few
examples:


The closing Ministerial Declaration from the United Nations Economic Conference
for Europe in 1990 asserts, “In order to achieve sustainable development, policies
must be based on the Precautionary Principle. . . . Where there are threats of serious
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason
for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation.”7



The 1992 Rio Declaration states, “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”8



The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change states: “Where there
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should
not be used as a reason for postponing [regulatory] measures, taking into account that
policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to
ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.”9

3

See Kenneth J. Arrow and Anthony C. Fisher, Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty, and
Irreversibility, 88 Q J Econ 312 (1974); W. David Montgomery and Anne E. Smith, Global Climate
Change and the Precautionary Principle, 6 Human and Ecological Risk Assessment 399 (2000).
4
See Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk 117-20 (2000).
5
Arie Trouwborst, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law (2002)
6
For a valuable and somewhat technical discussion, see Christian Gollier and Nicolas Treich, DecisionMaking under Scientific Uncertainty: The Economics of the Precautionary Principle, 27 J Risk and
Uncertainty 77 (2003).
7
Indur Goklany, The Precautionary Principle: A Critical Appraisal of Environmental Risk Assessment 5
(2003).
8
Quoted in Bjorn Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist 347 (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2001).
9
See Goklany, supra note, at 16.
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The Final Declaration of the First European “Seas At Risk” conference says that if
“the ‘worst case scenario’ for a certain activity is serious enough then even a small
amount of doubt as to the safety of that activity is sufficient to stop it taking place.”10
In American law, similar ideas are at work. A special precautionary principle

underlies the analysis of preliminary injunctions in cases involving a risk of irreparable
environmental harm.11 San Francisco has adopted its own precautionary principle, with
an emphasis on seriousness and irreversibility: “Where threats of serious or irreversible
damage to people or nature exist, lack of full scientific certainty about cause and effect
shall not be viewed as sufficient reason for the City to postpone cost effective measures
to prevent the degradation of the environment or protect the health of its citizens.”12 At
the national level, the National Environmental Policy Act requires agencies to discuss
“any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in
the proposed action should it be implemented.”13 Courts have been careful to insist that
environmental impact statements should be prepared at a time that permits consideration
of environmental effects before irretrievable commitments have been made.14 A number
of federal statutes, especially in the environmental context, specifically refer to
irreversible losses and make their prevention a high priority.15
For a long period, both courts and the executive branch also required agencies to
engage in “worst-case analysis,” focusing on potential catastrophes.16 That requirement
has been eliminated by the Council on Environmental Quality,17 but agencies continue to
be directed to explore “impacts which have catastrophic consequences, even if their
probability of occurrence is low.”18 Under the Clean Air Act, the Environmental
10

Final Declaration of the First European “Seas At Risk” Conference, Annex 1, Copenhagen, 1994.
See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F2 497 (1st Cir. 1989); on the complexities here, see below.
12
See San Francisco Precautionary Principle Ordinance, available at
http://temp.sfgov.org/sfenvironment/aboutus/innovative/pp/sfpp.htm
13
42 USC 102 (c)(5).
14
See Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F3d 1135 (9th Cir 2000); Scientists Inst. For Public Info v. AEC, 481 F2d
1079 (DC Cir 1973); Sierra Club v. Marsh, 976 F2d 763 (1st Cir 1985).
15
See, eg, 33 USC 2712(j) (making special exception to planning requirement for use of federal
resources in a situation requiring action to avoid irreversible loss of natural resources”); 42 USC 9611 (i)
(same exception for Superfund cleanups); 22 USC 2151p-1 (c)(2)(A) (requiring President to assist
developing countries in a way that responds to “the irreversible losses associated with forest destruction”).
16
See Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F2d 957 (5th Cir 1983); Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F2d 1240
th
(9 Cir 1984).
17
See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 US 332 (1989).
18
40 CFR 1502.22.
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Protection Agency is asked to build an “adequate margin of safety” into health-based
national ambient air quality standards.19 This explicitly precautionary requirement is not
limited to irreversible or catastrophic harms, but it might well be understood as an effort
to ensure against them.
The central notions here—irreversibility and catastrophe—play a critical role in
many domains, and they lie at the heart of countless discussions of how to deal with risks
to safety, health, and the environment. The problem is that both notions are exceedingly
ambiguous, and it is by no means clear how regulators should understand them. The
central purpose of this Article is unpack the ambiguities and to identify the proper role of
both concepts in law and policy. I shall show that standard option theory, emphasizing
the importance of irreversibility, 20 has important implications for environmental law, and
indeed that some statutes and doctrines show an implicit appreciation of this point. I shall
also show that regulators should sometimes attempt to eliminate worst-case scenarios,
even or perhaps especially if they cannot assign a probability to its occurrence. When no
such probability can be assigned, the best approach is to assess what is gained, and what
is lost, by eliminating the most catastrophic outcomes—a point that helps discipline the
inquiry into many risk-related problems, including global warming, terrorism, and
injunctions in environmental cases.
These general points lead to two refined versions of the Precautionary Principle.
The first involves irreversibility: When regulators lack information about the likelihood
and magnitude of a risk, it makes sense to spend extra resources to buy an “option” to
protect against irreversible harm until future knowledge emerges. The value of the option
is that of delaying the decision until better information is available. An emphasis on
options and irreversibility leads to a distinctive principle, which I shall call the
Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle.
The second principle involves catastrophe: When risks have extremely bad worstcase scenarios, it makes sense to pay special attention to those risks, even if they are
unlikely to come to fruition and even if existing information does not enable regulators to
make a reliable judgment about the probability that they will occur. An emphasis on the
19

42 USC 7409 (b)(1). An “ample margin of safety” is mentioned in connection with hazardous air
pollutants lacking a safe thresholds, see 42 USC 7412 (d)(4).
20
See Arrow and Fisher, supra note, for an early treatment.
4

need to attend to potentially catastrophic risks also yields a distinctive principle, which I
shall call the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle.
At first glance, these two principles seem to justify aggressive action to combat
many environmental risks, including those posed by global warming, threats to
endangered species, and genetic modification of food. Perhaps societies should invest
substantial resources in the reduction of greenhouse gases, first to prevent what might
turn out to be an irreversible loss, and second to stop the worst-case scenarios.21 Outside
of the environmental domain, the two principles bear on appropriate steps to prevent
terrorist attacks, epidemics, asteroid collisions, earthquakes, and more. An emphasis on
the two principles also has the advantage of suggesting the possibility of a rapprochement
between the risk judgments of experts and the risk judgments of ordinary people.22 As
risk analysts have long emphasized, ordinary people sometimes pay a great deal of
attention to whether risks are irreversible or potentially catastrophic.23 If the refined
precautionary principles can be defended, then ordinary intuitions turn out to be
plausible, and experts should accept them. Indeed the two principles might be combined,
in certain cases, into an Irreversible and Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle,24
which provides the strongest basis for aggressive regulation of greenhouse gases.
At the same time, I shall show that both principles are subject to important
qualifications. The unifying claim is that the refined precautionary principles should be
implemented with wide rather than narrow viewscreens. They must be attentive to the full
range of consequences, not simply to a subset. A focus on irreversibility, and on
catastrophic harm, threatens to violate this principle through a kind of selective
perception. More particularly, the idea of irreversibility is exceedingly ambiguous;
because time is linear, every step is in a literal sense irreversible. In the technical

21

See R. Posner, supra note, at 162, 184-86, 197, and in particular emphasizing “the practically
irreversible effect of greenhouse-gas emissions on the atmospheric concentration of those gases. . . .
Making shallower cuts now can be thought of as purchasing an option to enable global warming to be
stopped or slowed at some future at a lower cost.” Id. at 162.
22
See Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk 117, 148-51 (2000).
23
See id. These psychometric studies coexist, however, with evidence that people dismiss many lowprobability risks of catastrophe, as discussed below. A simple example is that people do not pay much
attention to the risk of asteroid collisions, even though there is a good argument that they should do so. See
Posner, supra note, at 24-29.
24
An early treatment of relevant points is Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar
Risks, 7 Ecology L.Q. 207 (1978).
5

literature, the problem of ambiguity is solved through a particular definition of
irreversibility.25 But under that definition, irreversibilities are usually on all sides of
environmental problems. If significant steps are taken to reduce greenhouse gases, those
very steps will inflict irreversible losses, environmental or economic—making it
necessary to explore their likelihood and magnitude in order to decide what to do. An
Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle is both coherent and sensible, but it calls for
precautions against the irreversible harms associated with environmental protection, as
well as against the irreversible harms associated with environmental neglect.
In addition, it can be costly, and even environmentally harmful, to avoid worstcase scenarios. If those scenarios are exceedingly unlikely, then there are clear limits on
how much regulators should do to eliminate them. If it would cost a great deal to avoid
those scenarios, or if doing so would subject people to high probabilities of very bad-case
scenarios, then avoiding the worst-case may not be sensible. It is both necessary and
possible, in short, to explore what is gained and what is lost by eliminating worst-case
scenarios. As we shall see, an understanding of the uses and limits of the refined versions
of the Precautionary Principle, focusing on irreversibility and catastrophe, casts new light
on the foundations of environmental law, and indeed on all aspects of law that deal with
the reduction of serious risks to safety and health.26
This Article comes in four parts. Part I briefly explores the conventional
Precautionary Principle, with an emphasis on the fact that precautionary steps often
produce risks of their own. Part II discusses the question of irreversibility. The key point
here is that because environmental harms are often irreversible, it is appropriate to spend
resources to maintain flexibility for the future; the theory of real options has important
implications for the theory and practice of environmental law, and indeed for regulation
in general. An understanding of the problem of irreversibility also helps to explain
continuing debates over the issuance of preliminary injunctions in environmental cases.
Armed with that understanding, we can discipline the analysis of injunctions in such
cases.

25
26

See, e.g., Tom Copeland and Vladimir Antikarocov, Real Options 8-13 (2001).
On related issues in tort law, see Ariel Porat and Alex Stein, Tort Liability under Uncertainty (2001).
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Part III turns to the risk of catastrophic harm. A particular focus is the difference
between risk, where probabilities can be assigned to various outcomes, and uncertainty,
where no such probabilities can be assigned. With respect to catastrophe, risk aversion is
perfectly sensible, but it is hard to defend the idea that regulators should generally seek to
eliminate the worst-case scenario, whatever the environmental and other costs of doing
so. Part III also offers some experimental evidence that people do not focus on the worstcase scenario under circumstances of either risk or uncertainty. The most important point
here is that a form of cost-benefit balancing, perhaps with distributional weights, can
inform the decision whether to eliminate the most catastrophic outcomes. Part IV offers
some brief remarks on the question whether experts and ordinary people display “rival
rationalities,” and on the relationship of irreversibility and catastrophe to that question.
I. The Precautionary Principle
In the face of risks of environmental harm, it has become common to invoke the
Precautionary Principle, an increasingly influential idea for environmental protection.27
My principal concerns here are irreversibility and catastrophe, but in order to understand
those problems, it is necessary to explore the Precautionary Principle more generally.
Unfortunately, there are twenty or more definitions of that principle, and they are
not compatible with one another.28 The most cautious and weak versions suggest, quite
sensibly, that a lack of decisive evidence of harm should not be a ground for refusing to
regulate. Controls might be justified even if it is impossible to establish a definite
connection between, for example, low-level exposures to certain carcinogens and adverse
effects on human health. Thus the Ministerial Declaration of the Second International
Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, held in London in 1987, sensibly
suggests: “Accepting that in order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging
effects of the most dangerous substances, a Precautionary Principle is necessary which

27

See, e.g., Precaution, Environmental Science, and Preventive Public Policy (Joel Tckner ed. 2003).
This section draws extensively from Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1003 (2003).
28
See Julian Morris, Defining the Precautionary Principle, in Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary
Principle 1-19 (Julian Morris, ed. 2000).
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may require action to control inputs of such substances even before a causal link has been
established by absolutely clear scientific evidence.”29
The

widely

publicized

Wingspread

Declaration,

from

a

meeting

of

environmentalists in 1998, goes much further: “When an activity raises threats of harm to
human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some
cause and effect relationships are not established scientifically. In this context the
proponent of the activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof.”30
In Europe, the Precautionary Principle is sometimes understood in a still stronger way,
suggesting that it is important to build “a margin of safety into all decision making.”31
According to one definition, the Precautionary Principle means “that action should be
taken to correct a problem as soon as there is evidence that harm may occur, not after the
harm has already occurred.”32 The word “may” is the crucial one here, because it signals
the need for corrective action even in the face of merely speculative evidence that the risk
is serious.33
In a comparably strong version, it is said that “the Precautionary Principle
mandates that when there is a risk of significant health or environmental damage to others
or to future generations, and when there is scientific uncertainty as to the nature of that
damage or the likelihood of the risk, then decisions should be made so as to prevent such
activities from being conducted unless and until scientific evidence shows that the
damage will not occur.”34 What is striking about this passage is its requirement that
potentially hazardous activities be prevented until they are shown to be safe. I have noted
that the Final Declaration of the First European “Seas At Risk” conference goes so far as
to say that if “the ‘worst case scenario’ for a certain activity is serious enough then even a
small amount of doubt as to the safety of that activity is sufficient to stop it taking
place.”35
29

Quoted in id. at 3.
Id. A strong version is defended in Carolyn Raffensperger & Peter L. deFur, Implementing the
Precautionary Principle: Rigorous Science and Solid Ethics, 5 Hum. & Ecol. Risk Assess. 933, 934 (1999).
31
See Bjorn Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist 348 (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2001).
32
http://www.logophilia.com/WordSpy/precautionaryprinciple.asp
33
See The Precautionary Principle for the Twenty-First Century, supra note, for support of this approach.
34
Testimony of Dr. Brent Blackwelder, President, Friends of the Earth, before the Senate Appropriations
Committee, Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, (Jan. 24, 2002).
35
Final Declaration of the First European “Seas At Risk” Conference, Annex 1, Copenhagen, 1994.
30
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A. Hazardous Precautions
The weak versions of the Precautionary Principle are unobjectionable and
important. Every day, individuals and nations take steps to avoid hazards that are far from
certain. We do not walk in moderately dangerous areas at night; we exercise; we buy
smoke detectors; we buckle our seatbelts; we might even avoid fatty foods (or
carbohydrates). Sensible governments regulate risks that, in individual cases or even in
the aggregate, have a well under 100% chance of coming to fruition.36 An individual
might ignore a mortality risk of 1/500,000, because that risk is quite small, but if 100
million citizens face that risk, the expected number of deaths is 200, and the nation had
better take the problem seriously.
For the moment let us understand the Precautionary Principle in a strong way, to
suggest that regulation is required whenever there is a possible risk to health, safety, or
the environment, even if the supporting evidence remains speculative and even if the
economic costs of regulation are high. Recall that under the Final Declaration of the First
European “Seas At Risk” conference, a serious worst-case scenario is said to justify
abandonment of activity even if there is only “a small amount of doubt as to the safety of
that activity”; recall too that under the National Environmental Policy Act, agencies must
pay close attention to risks that have only a small probability of occurrence.37 To avoid
absurdity, any emphasis on the idea of “possible risk” must be understood to require a
certain threshold of scientific plausibility. To support regulation, no one thinks that it is
enough if someone, somewhere, urges that a risk is worth taking seriously. But under the
Precautionary Principle in its stronger forms, the threshold burden is minimal, and once it
is met, there is a presumption in favor of regulatory controls. This version, as we shall
see, helps to clarify a significant problem with the idea of precaution, in a way that bears
on the more refined versions as well.
The real problem with the Precautionary Principle, thus understood, is that it
offers no guidance—not that it is wrong, but that it forbids all courses of action, including
regulation. Taken seriously, it is paralyzing, banning the very steps that it simultaneously
requires. In some cases, it should be easy to see that in its own way, stringent regulation
would actually run afoul of the Precautionary Principle. Consider the “drug lag,”
produced whenever the government takes a highly precautionary approach to the
introduction of new medicines and drugs onto the market.38 If a government insists on
such an approach, it will protect people against harms from inadequately tested drugs, in
a way that fits well with the goal of precaution; but it will also prevent people from
receiving potential benefits from those very drugs, and hence subjects people to serious
36

See 42 USC 7412(b)(9)(B) (allowing deletion from list of hazardous air pollutants in case of lifetime
risk of 1/1,000,000 or below).
37
40 CFR 1502.22.
38
Henry Grabowski and John Vernon, The Regulation of Pharmaceuticals: Balancing the Benefits and
Risks (1983); K.I. Kaitin and Jeffrey Brown, A Drug Lag Update, 29 Drug Information Journal 361 (1995).
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risks that they would not otherwise face. Is it “precautionary” to require extensive
premarketing testing, or to do the opposite? Or consider the case of DDT, often banned or
regulated in the interest of reducing risks to birds and human beings.39 The problem with
such bans is that in poor nations, they eliminate what appears to be the most effective
way of combating malaria—and thus significantly undermine public health.40
Precautionary steps seem both mandated and forbidden by the idea of precaution in its
strong forms.
Similar issues are raised by the continuing debate over whether certain
antidepressants impose a (small) risk of breast cancer.41 A precautionary approach might
seem to caution against use of such antidepressants because of their carcinogenic
potential. But the failure to use those depressants might well impose risks of its own,
certainly psychological and possibly even physical (because psychological ailments are
sometimes associated with physical ones as well). Or consider the decision, by the Soviet
Union, to evacuate and relocate more than 270,000 people in response to the risk of
adverse effects from the Chernobyl fallout. It is not clear that on balance, this massive
relocation project was justified on health grounds: “A comparison ought to have been
made between the psychological and medical burdens of this measure (anxiety,
psychosomatic diseases, depression and suicides) and the harm that may have been
prevented.”42 More generally, a sensible government might want to ignore the small risks
associated with low levels of radiation, on the ground that precautionary responses are
likely to cause fear that outweighs any health benefits from those responses.43
The Precautionary Principle is often invoked in connection with genetic
modification of food44—a plausible invocation in light of the multiple risks created by

39

See Robert Percival et al., Environmental Regulation 1122-23 (2003).
See id; Goklany, supra note, at 13-27.
41
See Judith P. Kelly et al., Risk of Breast Cancer According to Use of Antidepressants, Phenothiazines,
and Antihistamines, 150 Am. J. Epidemiology 861 (1999); C.R. Sharpe et al., The Effects of Tricyclic
Antidepressants on Breast Cancer Risk, 86 Brit. J. of Cancer 92 (2002).
42
Maurice Tubiana, Radiation Risks in Perpective: Radiation-Induced Cancer Among Cancer Risks,
39(1) Radiat. Environ. Biophy. 3, 8-10 (2000).
43
Id. For some counterevidence in an important context, see Lennart Hardell et al., Further Aspects on
Cellular and Cordless Telephones and Brain Tumours, 22 Intl. J. Oncology 399 (2003) (discussing
evidence of an association between cellular telephones and cancer).
44
See the discussion in Goklany, supra note, at 29-56.
40
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that practice.45 But many people believe that a failure to allow genetic modification might
well result in numerous deaths, and a small probability of many more.46 The reason is
that genetic modification holds out the promise of producing food that is both cheaper
and healthier—resulting, for example, in “golden rice,” which might have large benefits
in developing countries.47 The point is not that genetic modification will likely have those
benefits, or that the benefits of genetic modification outweigh the risks. The claim is only
that if the Precautionary Principle is taken literally, it is offended by regulation as well as
by nonregulation.
The example suggests that regulation sometimes violates the Precautionary
Principle because it gives rise to substitute risks, in the form of hazards that materialize,
or are increased, as a result of regulation.48 It is possible to go much further. A great deal
of evidence suggests the possibility that an expensive regulation can have adverse effects
on life and health.49 An early study found that a statistical life can be lost for every
expenditure of $7 million50; one study suggests that an expenditure of $15 million
produces a loss of life.51 Another suggests that poor people are especially vulnerable to
this effect—that a regulation that reduces wealth for the poorest 20% of the population
will have twice as large a mortality effect as a regulation that reduces wealth for the
wealthiest 20%.52 To be sure, both the phenomenon and the underlying mechanisms are
disputed.53 It is unnecessary to accept any particular amount here, or even to suggest that
there has been an unambiguous demonstration of an association between mortality and
regulatory expenditures. The only point is that reasonable people believe in that
45

See Morel et al., supra note, at 184-86.
See Kym Anderson and Chantal Nielsen, Golden Rice and the Looming GMO Debate: Implications
for the Poor, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=508463
47
Id.; see also Goklany, supra nte, at 30-41 (discussing environmental and health benefits of engineered
crops).
48
See the discussion of risk-related tradeoffs in John Graham & Jonathan Wiener, Risk vs. Risk (1995);
Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, in Cass R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason, 133-52 (2002).
49
Ralph Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by Economic Expenditures, 10 Risk Anal. 147 (1990); Randall
Lutter & John F. Morrall, III, Health-Health Analysis: A New Way to Evaluate Health and Safety
Regulation, 8(1) J. Risk & Uncertainty 43, 49 table 1 (1994).
50
See Keeney, supra note.
51
See Robert W. Hahn et al., Do Federal Regulations Reduce Mortality? (2000).
52
See Kenneth S. Chapman & Govind Hariharan, Do Poor People Have a Stronger Relationship Between
Income and Mortality Than the Rich? Implications of Panel Data for Health-Health Analysis, 12 J. Risk &
Uncertainty 51, 58-63 (1996).
53
See Randall Lutter & John F. Morrall, III, Health-Health Analysis: A New Way to Evaluate Health and
Safety Regulation, 8 J. Risk & Uncertainty 43, 49 table 1 (1994).
46
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association. It follow that a multimillion dollar expenditure for “precaution” has—as a
worst case scenario—significant adverse health effects, with an expenditure of $600
million as leading to perhaps as many as sixty lives lost.
This point makes the Precautionary Principle hard to implement not merely where
regulation removes “opportunity benefits,” or introduces or increases substitute risks, but
in any case in which the regulation costs a significant amount. If this is so, the
Precautionary Principle, for that very reason, raises doubts about many regulations. If the
principle argues against any action that carries a small risk of imposing significant harm,
then regulators should be reluctant to require large expenditures to reduce risks, simply
because those expenditures themselves carry risks. Here is the sense in which, the
Precautionary Principle is paralyzing: It stands as an obstacle to regulation and
nonregulation, and to everything in between.
A nation-by-nation study commissioned by the German Federal Environmental
Agency goes so far as to conclude that there are two separate camps in the industrialized
world: “precaution countries” (Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United
States) and “protection countries” (Japan, France, and the United Kingdom).54 If the
argument thus far is correct, this conclusion is implausible—not empirically but
conceptually. The universe of risks is far too large to permit categorizations of this kind.
The most general point is that no nation is precautionary in general and costly precautions
are inevitably taken against only those hazards that seem especially salient or insistent.55
Taken in its strongest and crudest forms, the Precautionary Principle wrongly suggests
that nations can and should adopt a general form of risk aversion. It is possible to take
precautions against particular risks, but it is not possible to take precautions against all of
them. It is possible to display aversion to particular hazards, but it is not possible to
display aversion to all of them.56
54

See Sand, supra note, at 448.
See David Vogel, The Hare and the Tortoise Revisited: The New Politics of Consumer and
Environmental regulation in Europe, 33 B. J. Pol. S. 557, 570-71 (2003). for a demonstration of this point
for Europe.
56
It might be tempting to defend the Precautionary Principle—certainly in the context of health, safety,
and the environment—on the ground that early warnings, in the form of merely suggestive evidence of
harm, often turn out to be correct. See The Precautionary Principle in the Twenty-First Century, supra note.
And it is right to insist that indisputable proof of harm should not be required to justify regulation; this is
the sense in which the weak version of the principle is both unobjectionable and important. But the fact that
suggestive evidence must be taken seriously does not render the strong version coherent, simply because
55
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B. A Note on Distributional Issues
Those who endorse the Precautionary Principle often do so on grounds of
fairness, believing that the principle will assist the most vulnerable members of society.57
Does the principle actually have that effect? In the United States, the Clean Air Act takes
a highly precautionary approach, requiring an “adequate margin of safety” and hence
regulation in the face of scientific uncertainty.58 At the same time, the Clean Air Act
delivers especially large benefits to poor people and members of minority groups—larger
benefits, on balance, than it gives to wealthy people.59 In the international domain,
aggressive action to combat climate change would be more beneficial to poor countries
than to wealthy ones.60 In the context of global warming, at least, the Precautionary
Principle might be invoked to prevent especially severe burdens on those in the worst
position to bear them.
It makes a great deal of sense to emphasize the distribution of domestic or
international risks, and the distributional effects of global warming are among the
strongest points in favor of aggressive regulation of greenhouse gases.61 But in many
cases, the Precautionary Principle, as applied, would have unfortunate distributional
effects. Consider the case of DDT. A ban on DDT, often supported by reference to the
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Precautionary Principle, is eminently justified in wealthy nations. But such a ban is likely
to have—and is actually having—unfortunate effects in at least some poor countries,
where DDT is the cheapest and most effective way of combating serious diseases, most
notably malaria.62 The case of genetic modification of food might well be a similar
example; according to some projections, the benefits are likely to be enjoyed by poor
people, not the wealthy.63 And recall that expensive regulations have a disproportionately
serious effect on poor people, simply because any price increases are hardest for them to
handle, and because the costs of regulation may well manifest themselves in fewer and
less remunerative jobs.64
Distributional issues should indeed be a central concern of a system of risk
regulation,65 but the Precautionary Principle is a crude, indirect, and sometimes perverse
way of incorporating distributional concerns. As a result, an emphasis on distribution
does not rescue the Precautionary Principle from the charge of incoherence. The real
question is whether more refined understandings of the principle can be developed.
II. Uncertainty, Options, and Irreversibility
It is possible to identify an Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle, applicable
to a subset of environmental risks.66 On plausible assumptions, the problem of
irreversibility does justify aggressive measures to combat environmental risks, under a
general attitude of “act, then learn,” as opposed to the tempting alternative of “wait and
learn.” With respect to global warming, for example, some people believe that it is most
sensible to use research as the first line of defense, refusing to commit substantial
resources until evidence of harm is clear.67 But if research alone allows continued
62
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emissions to produce irreversible risks, it might be best to take precautions now as a way
of preserving future flexibility.68 In the environmental context in general, this point
suggest that regulators should proceed with far more aggressive measures than would
otherwise seem justified.69
A. Option Value vs. Use Value
Begin with the monetary valuation of an environmental amenity, such as a
pristine area. Some people will be willing to pay to use the area; others will be willing to
pay to preserve it, even if they will not use it. Hence “existence value” is sometimes
included in the valuation of environmental amenities,70 and indeed federal courts have
insisted that agencies pay attention to that value in assessing damages to natural
resources.71 But people are also willing to pay for the option to use an environmental
amenity in the future, even if they are unsure whether they will exercise that option.72
Suppose that a pristine area might be developed in a way that ensures irreversible change.
Many people would be willing to pay a significant amount to preserve their option. Under
federal law, option value must also be considered in the assessment of natural resource
damages.73 Many regulations explore the role of option value in the environmental
context.74
Here, then, is a simple sense in which irreversible environmental harm causes a
loss that is not adequately captured in the standard economic measure of value. Some
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skeptics contend that it “is hard to imagine a price for an irreversible loss,”75 but people
do identify prices for such losses.76
B. The Basic Argument
The idea of option value, as used in the monetary valuation literature just
discussed, is closely related to the use of the notion of “options” in the domain that I shall
be emphasizing here. The simple claim is that when regulators are dealing with an
irreversible loss, and when they are uncertain about the timing and likelihood of that loss,
they should be willing to pay a sum—the option value—in order to maintain flexibility
for the future.77 The option might not be exercised if it turns out that the loss is not a
serious one. But if the option is purchased, regulators will be in a position to forestall the
loss if it turns out to be large.
In the domain of finance, options take multiple forms.78 An investor might be
willing to purchase land that is known to have deposits of gold; even if the cost of
extraction is too high to justify mining, ownership of the land creates an option to mine if
the cost falls.79 A standard “call option” is a right to purchase an asset prior to a specific
date at a specified price.80 In another variation, people might seek the right to abandon a
project at a fixed price, perhaps on the occurrence of a specified set of events.
Alternatively, they might obtain the right to scale back a project, to expand it, or to
extend its life. Options that recognize multiple sources of uncertainty, of the sort that can
be found for many environmental problems, are termed “rainbow options.”81
Option theory has countless applications outside of the domain of investments.
Suppose, for example, that because of law or social norms, it is difficult to divorce, so
75
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that a decision to marry cannot readily be reversed.82 If so, prospective spouses might be
willing to incur costs to maintain their flexibility before marrying—higher costs than they
would be willing to incur if divorce were easier. Narrow judicial rulings, of the sort
celebrated by judicial minimalists,83 can be understood as a way of “buying” an option, or
at least of “paying” a certain amount in return for flexibility. Judges who leave things
undecided, and who focus their rulings on the facts of particular cases, are in a sense
forcing themselves, and society as a whole, to purchase an option to pay for flexibility in
the resolution of subsequent problems. Whether that option is worthwhile depends on its
price and the benefits that it provides.
It should be readily apparent how an emphasis on option value might explain the
emphasis, in NEPA and other environmental statutes, on irreversible losses. The central
point of NEPA is to ensure that environmental factors receive serious consideration,84
and if irreversible losses are involved, the delay produced by the duty to generate an
environmental impact statement can be seen as payment for an option. It should also be
clear that the idea of option value might help give content to the Precautionary Principle,
which would, on this view, be understood as requiring societies to pay a kind of premium
in the face of potentially irreversible losses.85 An important implication involves global
warming; the argument for a global carbon tax is significantly strengthened by an
appreciation of the option value of conserving the atmospheric environment.86 Let us
elaborate the argument for the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle.
In a classic essay, Arrow and Fisher demonstrate that the ideas of uncertainty and
irreversibility have considerable importance to the theory of environmental protection.87
They imagine a situation in which the question is whether to preserve a virgin redwood
forest for wilderness recreation or instead to open it to clear-cut logging. Assume that if
the development option is chosen, the destruction of the forest is effectively
82
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irreversible.88 Arrow and Fisher argue that it matters whether the authorities cannot yet
assess the costs or benefits of a proposed development. If development produces “some
irreversible transformation of the environment, hence a loss in perpetuity of the benefits
from preservation,” then it is worth paying something to wait to acquire the missing
information. Their suggestion is that “the expected benefits of an irreversible decision
should be adjusted to reflect the loss of options it entails.”89
Much more recently, Fisher has generalized this argument to suggest that
“[w]here a decision problem is characterized by (1) uncertainty about future costs and
benefits of the alternatives, (2) prospects for resolving or reducing the uncertainty with
the passage of time, and (3) irreversibility of one or more of the alternatives, an extra
value, an option value, properly attaches to the reversible alternative(s).”90 To pass a costbenefit test, it follows that an irreversible decision must clear a higher hurdle. The
intuition here is both straightforward and appealing: More steps should be taken to
prevent harms that are effectively final than to prevent those that can be reversed at some
cost. If an irreversible harm is on side, and a reversible one on the other, an
understanding of option value suggests that it is worthwhile to spend a certain amount to
preserve future flexibility, by paying a premium to avoid the irreversible harm.
Judge Richard Posner has invoked a point of this sort as a justification for
aggressive steps to combat global warming.91 Posner acknowledges that the nature of the
threat of global warming is disputed, and hence it is tempting to wait to regulate until we
have more information. But there is a serious problem with waiting, which is “the
practically irreversible effect of greenhouse-gas emissions on the atmospheric
concentration of those gases.”92 Thus Posner concludes that making “shallower cuts now
can be thought of as purchasing an option to enable global warming to be stopped or
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slowed at some future time at a lower cost.”93 The reduction in cost, as a result of current
steps, could result from lowering current emissions or simply from increasing the rate of
technological innovations that make pollution reduction less costly in the future. Posner
concludes that the “option approach is applicable to other catastrophic risks as well, such
as the risks associated with genetically modified crops.”94
The general point here is that as in the stock market, those involved in
environmental protection are trying to project a stream of costs and benefits over time;
the ability to project the revenue stream will improve and hence much can be gained from
being able to make the decision later in time rather than earlier.95 If more accurate
decisions can be made in the future, then there is a (bounded) value to putting the
decision off to a later date.96 The key point is that uncertainty and irreversibility should
lead to a sequential decision-making process.
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If better information will emerge,

regulators might seek an approach that preserves greater flexibility.98
C. Irreversibilities
Unfortunately, the idea of irreversibility is highly ambiguous. On one view, an
effect is irreversible when restoration to the status quo is impossible or at best extremely
difficult, at least on a relevant timescale. For example, the “decision not to preserve a rich
reservoir of biodiversity such as the 60 million-year-old Korup forest in Nigeria is
irreversible. The alteration or destruction of a unique asset of this type has an awesome
finality.”99 If this is the appropriate interpretation of irreversibility, then it is an aspect of
seriousness. An alternative interpretation, familiar in the economic literature on options,
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sees irreversibility in terms of sunk costs. The two interpretations lead to different
understandings of the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle.
1. Irreversibility and seriousness. From one point of view, no clear line separates
the reversible from the irreversible. The question is not whether some effect can be
reversed, but instead at what cost; areas that have been developed, or otherwise harmed,
can often be returned to their original state, even if at considerable expense. Lost forests
can themselves be restored. But for the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle, there
is a more serious conceptual difficulty, which is that whether a particular act is
“irreversible” depends on how it is characterized. Any death, of any living creature, is
irreversible, and those who invoke irreversibility do not intend the notion of irreversible
harm to apply to each and every mortality risk. What is true for living creatures is true for
rocks and refrigerators too; if these are destroyed, they are destroyed forever. And
because time is linear, every decision is, in an intelligible sense, irreversible. If I play
tennis at 11 am today, that decision cannot be reversed, and what might have been done
at that time will have been permanently lost. If government builds a new highway in
upstate New York in May, that particular decision will be irreversible, even though the
highway can be replaced or eliminated. This is the sense in that “irreversibility” depends
on how the underlying act is characterized; if we characterize it narrowly, to be and to do
precisely what it is and does, any act is literally irreversible by definition.
Environmentalists who are concerned about irreversibility must have something
far more particular in mind. They must mean something like a large-scale alteration in
environmental conditions, one that imposes permanent, or nearly permanent, changes on
those subject to them. But irreversibility in this sense is not a sufficient reason for a
highly precautionary approach. At a minimum, the irreversible change has to be for the
worse, and it must also rise to a certain level of magnitude. A truly miniscule change in
the global temperature, even if permanent, would not justify expensive precautions if it is
benign or if it imposes little in the way of harm.100 For this reason, it is tempting to
understand the idea of irreversibility, for environmental purposes, as inseparable from
that of seriousness. A loss of a wisdom tooth is irreversible, but not a reason for particular
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precautions; a loss of an extremely small forest, with little wildlife, hardly justifies a
special principle, even if that loss cannot be reversed.
At first glance, then, irreversibility matters only because of its connection with the
magnitude of the harm—an issue explored below in connection with potentially
catastrophic risks. Compare in this regard the standard of “irreparable harm” as a
precondition to the grant of a preliminary injunction.101 If a harm is irreparable, it can be
avoided only by grant of the injunction, but irreparability is not a sufficient condition for
granting the injunction; the harm must be serious as well as irreparable.102 And if
irreversibility in environmental protection is to be analyzed in the same way, then an
Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle is part of a Catastrophic Harm Precautionary
Principle, or at least a Significant Harm Precautionary Principle. If so, the Irreversible
Harm Precautionary Principle is not distinctive. The principle is also vulnerable, some of
the time, to the same objections that apply to the Precautionary Principle as a whole. As
we have seen, significant harms may well be on all sides of risk-related problems, and a
focus on one set of risks will give rise to others, perhaps environmental risks as well.
2. Irreversibility and sunk costs. Analysts of real options understand the idea of
irreversibility in a technical way.103 Irreversible investments are sunk costs—those that
cannot be recovered. Examples include expenditures on advertising and marketing, or
even capital investments designed to improve the performance of a factory.104 In fact the
purchase of motor vehicles, computers, and office equipment is not fully reversible,
because purchase cost substantially exceeds resale cost.105 Reversible investments include
the purchase of ordinary stocks and bonds. The problem with an investment that is
irreversible is that those who make it relinquish “the possibility of waiting for new
information that might affect the desirability or timing of the expenditure, and this lost
option value is an opportunity cost that must be included as part of the investment.”106
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Everyone agrees that we should characterize, as irreversible harms, environmental
effects that are both serious and extremely expensive and time-consuming to reverse.107
This is the factor that leads Posner and others to argue for the purchase of an “option” to
slow down global warming at a lower rate in the future. Immediate adoption of a policy
produces a “sunk benefit.”108 But this argument ignores an important point:
Irreversibility, in this sense, lies on all sides.109 Regulation that reduces one
environmental risk might well increase another environmental risk; efforts to reduce the
dangers associated with fossil fuels, for example, may lead to increased dependence on
nuclear energy, as in fact has happened in China.110 As with the Precautionary Principle
in general, so with the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle in particular: Measures
that the principle requires, on grounds on safety and health, might well be prohibited on
exactly those grounds. And there is a more general point. If steps are taken to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, capital costs will be incurred, and they cannot be recouped.
Sunk costs are a familiar feature of environmental regulation, in the form of mandates
that require technological change.111 We are dealing, then, with irreversibilities, not
irreversibility.
This point much complicates the case for an Irreversible Harm Precautionary
Principle. As Fisher writes for global warming, “it is not clear whether the conditions of
the problem imply that investment in control ought to be slowed or reduced, while
waiting for information needed to make a better decision, or that investment should come
sooner to preserve the option to protect ourselves from impacts that may be revealed in
the future as serious or even catastrophic.”112 It is for this reason that many economists
have concluded, unlike Judge Posner, that the existence of uncertainty and irreversibility
107
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argue for less, not more, in a way of investments in reducing greenhouse gas
emissions.113 Everything depends on the likelihood and magnitude of the losses on all
sides.
Judge Posner’s analysis does not use the idea of options in the technical sense. He
emphasizes, correctly, that because of the cumulative effect of emissions on the
atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide, a steady or even declining rate of emissions
will cause that concentration to increase.114 He emphasizes that it may be more costly to
reduce global warming in the future than in the present—a point that comes close to the
technical understanding of irreversibility in the economic literature. But it is a gap in
Judge Posner’s analysis that he neglects to attend to the irreversible losses associated
with greenhouse gas reductions. On the other hand, any advice to “wait and learn”
depends on a contentious empirical assumption, which is that we lose very little if we
defer investments while waiting to obtain more information about the benefits.115 If a
great deal is lost by deferring such investments, then the judgment should be reversed;
and there is reason to believe that for global warming, the irreversible losses associated
with climate change do indeed justify the irreversible losses associated with greater
investments in emissions reductions, world-wide.116
D. Qualifications and Conclusions
The arguments for an Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle, along with an
understanding of its central limitations, are now in place. But there are three important
qualifications, involving optimal delay, distributional considerations, and precommitment
value. Let us briefly explore each of these.
1. Irreversibilities and optimal delay. The general notion of optimal delay
provides important countervailing considerations. Future generations will almost
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certainly be both wealthier and more knowledgeable than the present generation; for this
reason, they will be in a far better position, and possibly an unimaginably better position,
to handle environmental problems that materialize in their time.117 In the view of one
commentator, the nearly inevitable increase in wealth over time means that it “makes no
sense to make current generations ‘pay’ for the problems of future generations.”118 In
addition, expensive investments in greenhouse gas reduction may well diminish available
resources for future generations, leaving them with less “to devote to subsequent damage
control.”119 There is a final point. For many environmental problems, the irreversible
costs of emissions reductions are incurred immediately, whereas the irreversible costs of
emissions will be incurred in the future. This difference strengthens public resistance to
emissions reductions, in a way that fits with standard claims about the need to discount
future effects.120
The argument for “wait and learn” is strengthened by these points. But any such
argument must also take account of the incontrovertible fact that waiting simultaneously
threatened to diminish the flexibility of future decisionmakers, and perhaps severely.121
2. Irreversibilities and distribution. At first glance, an Irreversible Harm
Precautionary Principle might seem to be especially beneficial to disadvantaged
people.122 In the context of global warming, aggressive precautions are projected to give
far more to poor countries than to rich ones, partly because rich nations are so much less
dependent on agriculture .123 Nonetheless, there is no simple connection between
distributional goals and an emphasis on irreversible harms. Some of the risks associated
with genetic engineering are irreversible,124 but as we have seen, the benefits of genetic
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engineering are likely to be felt above all in poor nations.125 The analysis of distributional
goals must be undertaken separately from the analysis of irreversibility.
3. Precommitment value. In some domains, future flexibility is undesirable, and
people are willing to pay a great deal to eliminate it. The tale of Ulysses and the Sirens is
perhaps the most familiar example,126 and the idea of precommitment has many legal
applications.127 In the environmental context, regulators might be willing to pay for
precommitment strategies that will operate as a constraint on interest-group power,
myopia, weakness of will, excessively high discount rate, cognitive biases, or other
problems. Indeed, the conventional Precautionary Principle, understood to impose a
thumb on the scales in favor of environmental protection, might be explained in these
terms.128
The difficulty, for any such explanation, should now be familiar: Any
precommitment strategy may give rise to problems, including environmental problems,
for which a precommitment strategy might also be justified. It is nonetheless important to
see that option value is sometimes paralleled by “precommitment value,” for which
regulators might also be willing to spend a great deal. The literature on options, and on
the need to maintain flexibility, has not yet come to terms with situations in which
flexibility is a problem rather than a solution.
4. Conclusions. There is a coherent and distinctive Irreversible Harm
Precautionary Principle, taking the form of willingness to pay a certain price to preserve
environmental flexibility for the future. In many settings, it makes sense to pay for an
option to avoid a risk of irreversible losses. The amount of the payment depends on the
magnitude of the loss if it is irreversible. If irreversible losses are on both sides, then it is
necessary to assess their likelihood and their magnitude. We can find an implicit
understanding of option value in the emphasis on irreversibility in NEPA and other
federal statutes, along with many international agreements. But because environmental
expenditures are typically sunk costs, an emphasis on irreversibility will sometimes argue
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in favor of delaying, rather than accelerating, environmental protection. Whether it does
so depends on the magnitude and likelihood of the relevant effects.
E. Environmental Injunctions
An understanding of these points helps to explain some longstanding disputes the
issuance of preliminary injunctions in environmental cases. For many years, some courts
of appeals had held that when environmental harm was alleged, district courts should
adopt a presumption of irreparable damage and indeed a presumption in favor of
injunctive relief.129 In NEPA cases, the result was a likely injunction if the agency had
failed to prepare an adequate environmental impact statement: “Irreparable damage is
presumed when an agency fails to evaluate thoroughly the environmental impact of a
proposed action.”130 But what is the basis for this presumption? And what follows from
it? Does it follow, for example, that the United States Navy must be enjoined from
conducting weapons-training operations before it has obtained a permit to discharge
ordnance into the sea?
In response to the last question, the Supreme Court offered a negative answer.131
Rejecting the idea that environmental violations should give rise to automatic injunctions,
the Court said that an injunction is an equitable remedy, subject to traditional balancing,
and that it would “not lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from
established principles” permitting district courts to exercise their discretion.132 In a
subsequent case, involving the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, the Court
underlined the point and expressly rejected the presumption of irreparable harm in
environmental cases.133 “This presumption is contrary to traditional equitable
principles.”134 Nonetheless, the Court stressed environmental problems raise distinct
issues, because “[e]nvironmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately
remedied by money damages and is often permanent or at least of long duration, i.e.,
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irreparable.”135 It follows that if an environmental injury is likely, “the balance of harms
will usually favor the issuance of an injunction to protect the environment.”136
When courts of appeals spoke in terms of a presumption in favor of injunctive
relief, they might be understood as adopting a version of the Irreversible Harm
Precautionary Principle—assuming that environmental harm is irreversible in the relevant
sense, and requiring a strong showing by those who seek to proceed in the face of that
harm. This interpretation helps to explain the simplest exception to the lower courts’
presumption: cases in which “irreparable harm to the environment would result if such
relief were granted.”137 If, for example, an injunction against the use of a logging road
would prevent the removal of diseased trees and hence allow the spread of infect
infection through national forests, no injunction would issue.138
Here, then, is a clear recognition of the existence of environment-environment
tradeoffs, in a way that requires a qualification of any Irreversible Harm Precautionary
Principle. And when the Supreme Court rejected the presumption, it did so in favor of
traditional equitable balancing, in a way that recognized that serious harms, and perhaps
irreversible harms, are on all sides. But even in doing so, the Court endorsed a kin of
Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle through its explicit recognition that
environmental injury “is often permanent or at least of long duration.”
What still remains undecided, after the Court’s decisions in the 1980s, is the
appropriate judicial posture in the face of violations of NEPA.139 The Court’s rejection of
a presumption in favor of preliminary injunctions might well be taken to suggest that
such injunctions ought rarely to issue in NEPA cases140—especially, perhaps, in light of
the fact that NEPA is a purely procedural statute, one that imposes information-gathering
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duties on agencies without requiring them to take that information into account.141 If
courts cannot forbid agencies to act as they choose after producing an adequate
environmental impact statement, injunctions might seem an odd remedy in the NEPA
setting. But in the most elaborate discussion of the question, then-Circuit Judge Breyer
suggested that injunctions are often appropriate in NEPA cases.142 The discussion
endorses an appropriately constrained Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle, adapted
to the NEPA setting.143
Judge Breyer did not contend that a presumption in favor of injunctive relief
would be appropriate for environmental cases in general. Instead he argued that NEPA is
meant to prrvent a particular kind of injury, one that should play a central role in the
decision whether to grant an injunction. The purpose of NEPA is to ensure that officials
take environmental considerations into account before they embark on a course of action.
“Thus, when a decision to which NEPA obligations attach is made without the informed
environmental consideration that NEPA requires, the harm that NEPA intends to prevent
has been suffered.”144 That harm is the increased risk to the environment that arises
“when governmental decisionmakers make up their minds without having before them an
analysis (with prior public comment) of the likely effects of their decision upon the
environment.”145
Irreversibility is central here, for it is simply the case that administrators are less
likely to destroy a nearly completed project than one that has only started. The relevant
harm “may well have to do with the psychology of decisionmakers, and perhaps a more
deeply rooted psychological instinct not to tear down projects once they are built.”146
Judge Breyer’s point, then, is that “the district court should take account of the potentially
irreparable nature of this decisionmaking risk to the environment when considering a
request for preliminary injunction.”147
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None of this means that in NEPA cases, preliminary injunctions should issue as a
matter of course; that view would endorse the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle
in its crudest form. Sometimes injunctions will themselves impose serious harm, and
sometimes the risk to the environment is trivial.148 But in NEPA cases, it makes sense to
consider, as a relevant factor, the risk that an inadequately informed decision to proceed
will alter the status quo, ensuring that once an environmental impact statement is
produced, it will be too late to have a meaningful effect on the outcome. If delay is not
exceedingly costly, and if the risk of environmental harm is serious, injunctive relief is
appropriate for NEPA violations. An understanding of the risk of irreversibility helps to
explain why.
III. On Catastrophes and Worst Case Scenarios
On one understanding of irreversibility, the real problem is seriousness: A loss of
a species, or of a pristine area, is far worse if the loss is permanent. Many international
treaties focus on serious and in particular on catastrophic harm.149 The line between a
noncatastrophic and a catastrophic harm rests on the magnitude of the adverse effects.
For present purposes, let us simply understand a catastrophic harm to involve a large
number of human deaths—not thousands, and not even hundreds of thousands, but
millions.150
A. Against Catastrophic Risk, 1: A Modest Principle
Environmental regulation is often concerned with low probability events having
especially bad worst-case scenarios. The standard approach to risk regulation fully
supports that concern. To see why, consider three stylized environmental problems,
creating three quite different sorts of risks. (a) The first problem creates a 999,999 in a
million chance that no one will die, and a 1 in a million chance that 200 million people
will die. (b) The second problem creates a 50% chance that no one will die and a 50%
chance that 400 people will die. (c) The third problem creates a 100% chance that 200
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people will die. Suppose that government can eliminate all three problems at a specified
cost.
Each of these risks presents an expected loss of 200 lives. If outcomes and
probabilities are simply multiplied, the three problems will be seen as equivalent. In
problem (a), my special concern, it would be difficult to defend that view that no
resources should be devoted to eliminating the underlying risk. Suppose that a human life
is valued at $6 million. If so, then $1.2 billion should be expended for eliminating the risk
involved in problem (a). And in fact, this is the approach counseled by the government’s
current approach to risk reduction. 151 Let us begin, then, with the most modest kind of
Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle—one that favors precautionary steps based on
expected value calculations of this sort. Note that under this approach, catastrophes are
not receiving any particular attention. The central point is that they do not deserve less
attention than higher probability harms with equivalent expected outcomes.
Despite its modesty, this form of the Precautionary Principle has important uses.
In many contexts, human beings treat low-probability risks as if they were zero,
especially if those risks are unlikely to come to fruition in the near future.152 And because
judgments about probability are often driven by the availability heuristic,153 people may
well treat low-probability risks as if they were zero probability risks. By their very nature,
low-probability risks are unlikely to be accompanied by “available” instances of realworld harm. The importance of the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle is
concerned by the fact that when a risk probability is below a certain threshold, people
treat the risk as essentially zero, and are willing to pay little or nothing for insurance in
the event of loss.154 Such responses provide support for the intuitive suggestion that some
risks are simply “off-screen”—whereas others, statistically not much larger, can come
151
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“on screen” and produce behavioral changes.155 The central idea behind the most modest
form of the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle is that low probability, high harm
risks should be treated in accordance with their expected value.
This principle, based on expected value, might well provide more protection than
accords with ordinary intuitions. In order to obtain a preliminary understanding of those
intuitions, I conducted an experiment with 176 law students,156 who were asked the
following question:
The government is considering two environmental problems. The first creates a
one in one million risk of killing 200 million people, and a 999,999 in one million risk of
killing zero people. The second creates a one in ten risk of killing 2000 people, and a
nine in ten risk of killing zero people. Do you think:
(a)
(b)
(c)

the first problem has higher priority?
the second problem has higher priority?
the two problems have equal priority?

A strong plurality –- 41%—chose (b), whereas 36% chose (c) and only 22%
chose (a). In short, far more respondents were risk-seeking than risk-averse in the domain
of low-probability catastrophes; for low-probability risks of disaster, they were willing to
take their chances, at least when the comparison risk involves a higher probability risk
with an equivalent expected value. Of course law students at particular institutions may
not be representative of the population as a whole, but it is reasonable to expect that the
relatively lower concern for a low-probability, high-harm risk would be even more
pronounced within the general population. If so, attending to expected value would have
significant effects in the case of potentially catastrophic harm.157 To the extent that many
people show little concern about global warming, part of the explanation may well lie in
the fact that human beings often neglect low probability, high harm risks, especially if the

155

Id.
One hundred and four were at the University of Alabama Law School and seventy-two were at the
University of Chicago Law School; the numbers were substantially the same across the two schools.
157
Notably, over one-third of respondents in this experiment were risk-neutral, perhaps because law
students are taught to attend to expected value—a tendency that would be expected to be less pronounced
in the general population. It might have been anticipated that University of Chicago law students would be
more incline to risk-neutrality than University of Alabama law students, because of the prevalence of
economic analysis at the former institution, but the figures were essentially the same: 37.5% of Chicago
students were risk neutral, compared to 35.5% of Alabama students.
156

31

costs would be incurred immediately and if the benefits would not be realized until the
distant future.158
B. Against Catastrophic Risk, 2: Expected Value, Prospect Theory, and (Bounded)
Risk Aversion
A Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle, emphasizing expected value, raises
several questions. The first is whether a low probability risk of catastrophe might not
deserve more attention than higher probability risks with apparently equivalent expected
value. Perhaps people should be especially attentive to low-probability, high consequence
hazards. The reason is that it is plausible to think that the loss of 200 million people is
more than 1000 times worse than the loss of 2000 people. Indeed, the former loss might
be dramatically worse than a mere exercise in multiplication might suggest. Consider the
real-world meaning of a loss of 200 million people in the United States. In that event, the
nation would find it extremely hard to recover. Its private and public institutions would
be damaged for a long time, perhaps forever. What kind of governance structure would it
have? What would its economy look like? Future generations would inevitably suffer.
The effect of a catastrophe greatly outruns a simple multiplication of a certain number of
lives lost.
It follows that the overall costs of losing two-thirds of the American population
are far more than 100,000 times the loss if 2000 people are killed. Consider in this regard
the "Buffalo Creek Syndrome," documented several times in the aftermath of major
disasters. Nearly two years after the collapse of a dam that left 120 dead and 4,000
homeless, psychiatric researchers continued to find significant psychological and
sociological changes; survivors were characterized by a loss of direction and energy,
other disabling character changes, and a loss of communality.159 One evaluator attributed
this loss of direction specifically to "the loss of traditional bonds of kinship and
neighborliness."160 Genuine catastrophes, involving the loss of millions of people, would
magnify that loss to an unimaginable degree. There is a detailed literature on the “social
amplification of risk,” exploring secondary social losses, from one or another event, that
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can greatly outrun the initial effect of that event.161 A Catastrophic Harm Precautionary
Principle, devoting special attention to risks with large secondary losses, is well
supported by an understanding of social amplification.
In any case (and this is an independent point), a well-known alternative to
expected utility theory, prospect theory, predicts risk aversion in circumstances of just
this sort. 162 It follows that if the question is properly framed, people may be willing to
devote special priority to a low probability risk of catastrophe, with the degree of priority
depending on the degree of risk aversion.163 Especially in light of the secondary costs of
catastrophe, it might be concluded that whatever the right figure is, the simple
aggregation ($6 million multiplied by the number of lives lost) produces implausibly low
figures when the question is the death of millions. Perhaps it makes sense to build a
distinctive premium, called “catastrophe aversion,” into case (a). This idea might be used
as the basis for a second and more aggressive kind of Catastrophic Harm Precautionary
Principle, embodying that premium.
This claim might be supported by questioning the use of the $6 million figure for
the value of a human life. That figure is a product of studies of actual workplace risks,
attempting to determine how much workers are paid to assume mortality hazards.164 The
relevant risks usually are in the general range of 1/10,000 to 1/100,000.165 The calculation
of VSL is a product of simple arithmetic. Suppose that workers must be paid $600, on
average, to assume a risk of 1/10,000. If so, the value of a statistical life would be said to
be $6 million. But if someone is willing to pay $60 to avoid a risk of 100,000, it does not
follow that they would be willing to pay (only) $60 to avoid a risk of 100,000 when that
risk might come to fruition for millions of people at the same time. People might be
willing to show a kind of catastrophe premium, stemming not from risk aversion, but
from a special distaste for risks of true disaster.
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I do not mean to settle the question of monetization here. My only suggestion is
that for a number of reasons, it makes sense to show special concern for low probability
risks of catastrophe. If so, a Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle is justified. There
is a clear implication for such problems as global warming, genetic modification of food,
nuclear power, and terrorism: In all of these contexts, attention to the expected value of
the harm is warranted, together with a premium that recognizes the secondary effects that
results from the magnitude of the danger. But from the analysis thus far, what is true in
the context of irreversible harms is true for the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary
Principle as well. The amount of the premium is bounded, and everything depends on the
probability of the risk, its size, and the various costs associated with reducing or
eliminating it.
Thus far, then, the territory is conventional. Attention to expected value justifies a
concern with low probability risks of real disaster; and the degree of attention must be
attuned to the distinctive problems and costs associated with catastrophe. Even if
regulators are risk-neutral, they will devote substantial resources to the reduction of such
risks. In view of the high stakes, a degree of risk-aversion may well make sense in this
context, complementing a focus on the problem of irreversibility to suggest, for example,
that significant resources should be devoted to the problems of global warming and
depletion of the ozone layer.166 On the other hand, it is important to attend to the
environmental and other risks associated with reducing those problems.167 An analysis of
this kind might be used to specify appropriate responses.168 What I am adding here is that
this analysis might be undertaken under the general framework of a Catastrophic Harm
Precautionary Principle.
C. Catastrophic Harm, Timing, and Politics
The risk of catastrophe can be immediate, as in the case of terrorist attacks; but
sometimes it is clear that if a catastrophe will occur, it will not be until the distant future,
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as in the case of global warming. When the costs of precautions are incurred
immediately, and when the benefits will not be enjoyed until decades later, people are
likely to be extremely averse to precautionary steps, even if they are justified. Of course
the aversion might make sense if it is based on a decision to apply the appropriate
discount rate to future benefits (a highly controversial question169). But it is easy to
imagine situations in which future harms are being treated as irrelevant, or nearly so,
because of social myopia, wishful thinking,170 or a simple failure of imagination or
empathy with those who will be at risk. For these reasons, there is a particular need for a
Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle when the risk will not materialize until the
distant future.
The point can be fortified with a reference to likely political dynamics. If the costs
of precautions will be incurred immediately, and if the benefits will not be enjoyed for
many decades, elected officials will have a strong incentive to delay. The reason is that
they will face political retribution for imposing immediate costs and might well receive
little or no political gain for delivering long-term benefits. In the case of global warming,
the temporal disparity between costs and benefits creates a strong incentive to delay even
if immediate precautions are justified, simply because those who are most likely to
benefit do not vote.171 This point provides an additional reason to endorse a Catastrophic
Harm Precautionary Principle, one that attempts to overcome the danger that future risks
will receive less attention than they deserve.
D. Against Catastrophic Risk, 3: Uncertainty
Is it possible to support a still more aggressive kind of Catastrophic Harm
Precautionary Principle? To approach this question, it is necessary to venture into some
technical waters.
In some contexts, environmental and other risk-related problems involve hazards
of ascertainable probability; and ascertainable probability has been the assumption of the
discussion thus far. It may well be possible to say that the risk of death, from a certain
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activity, is 1/100,000, or at least that it ranges from (say) 1/20,000 to 1/500,000, with an
exposed population of (say) 10 million. Or it may be possible to say that the risk of
catastrophic harm from global warming is under 10% but above 1%.172 But as the
economist Frank Knight has maintained, it is possible to imagine instances in which
analysts cannot specify even a range of probability.173 Hence regulators, and ordinary
people, are often acting in a situation of uncertainty (where outcomes can be identified
but no probabilities can be assigned) rather than risk (where outcomes can be identified
and probabilities assigned to various outcomes).174 And they are sometimes acting under
conditions of ignorance, in which they are unable to specify either the probability of bad
outcomes or their nature—where regulators do not even know the magnitude of the
harms that they are facing.175
When existing knowledge allows regulators to identify outcomes, but does not
permit them to assign probabilities to each, it is sometimes said to be rational to follow
the maximin principle: Choose the policy with the best worst-case outcome.176 In the
environmental context, perhaps elaborate precautions can be justified by reference to the
maximin principle, asking officials to identify the worst case among the various options,
and to select that option whose worst-case is least bad. Perhaps the maximin principle
would lead to an exceptionally aggressive form of the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary
Principle, by, for example, urging elaborate steps to combat global warming. Suppose
that such steps would impose various hardships, but that even in the worst case, these are
not nearly so bad as the worst cases associated with global warming. It follows that if
aggressive measures are justified to reduce the risks associated with global warming, one
172
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reason is that those risks are potentially catastrophic and existing science does not enable
us to assign probabilities to the worst-case scenarios.177 The same analysis might be
applied to many problems, including the risks associated with nuclear energy178 and
terrorism.
E. Against Worst-Case Analysis
To understand these claims, we need to back up a bit and to investigate maximin
in more detail. Does it generally make sense to eliminate the worst-case scenario? Put the
question of uncertainty to one side and begin with a numerical example that involves risk
instead: Which would you prefer?
(a) A 99.9% chance of gaining $2000, and a 0.1% chance of losing $6, or
(b) A 50% chance of gaining $5, and a 50% chance of losing $5.
Under maximin, (b) is preferable—but under standard accounts of rationality, it
would be much more sensible to select (a), which has a far higher expected value. To
choose (b), one would have to show an extraordinary degree of risk aversion.
Now turn to a mundane illustration of the kinds of decisions in which maximin
might seem attractive: A reporter, living in Los Angeles, has been told that he can take
one of two assignments. First, he can go to a nation, say Iraq, that is facing a large
amount of terrorism. Second, he can go to Paris to cover anti-American sentiment in
France. The Iraq assignment has, in his view, two polar outcomes: a) he might have the
most interesting and rewarding experience of his professional life or b) he might be
killed. The Paris assignment has two polar outcomes of its own: a) he might have an
interesting experience, one that is also a great deal of fun and b) he might be lonely and
homesick. It might seem tempting for the reporter to choose Paris, on the ground that the
worst-case scenario for that choice is so much better than the worst-case scenario for
Iraq. And if this is correct, the conclusion might bear on regulatory policy, where one or
another approach has an identifiably worst worst-case scenario.179
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But maximin is not always a sensible decision rule. Suppose that the reporter now
has the choice of staying in Los Angeles or going to Paris; suppose too that on personal
and professional grounds, Paris is far better. It would make little sense for him to invoke
maximin in order to stay in Los Angeles on the ground that the plane to Paris might
crash. A plane crash is of course extremely unlikely, but it cannot be ruled out. Using an
example of this kind, John Harsanyi contends that maximin should be rejected on the
ground that it produces irrationality, even madness: “If you took the maximin principle
seriously you could not ever cross the street (after all, you might be hit by a car); you
could never drive over a bridge (after all, it might collapse); you could never get married
(after all, it might end in a disaster), etc. If anybody really acted in this way he would
soon end up in a mental institution.”180
Harsanyi’s argument might also be invoked to contest the use of maximin in the
choice between Iraq and Paris. Perhaps the reporter should attempt to specify the
likelihood of being killed in Iraq, rather than simply identifying the worst-case scenario.
Perhaps maximin is a way of neglecting probability, and hence a form of irrationality. In
some circumstances, people do display probability neglect, in a way that ensures attention
to the worst-case scenario.181 But if probabilities can actually be assessed, and if that
scenario is extremely unlikely to come to fruition, probability neglect is hard to defend
even for people who are exceptionally risk-averse. Suppose that the risk of death, in Iraq,
turns out to be 1/1,000,000, and that the choice of Iraq would be much better, personally
and professionally, than the choice of Paris. It is necessary to know something about the
reporter’s values and tastes to understand how to resolve this problem, but it is certainly
plausible to think that the reporter should choose Iraq rather than make the decision by
obsessively fixating on the worst that might happen. Recall that the Council of
Environmental Quality no longer requires worst-case analysis; it refuses to do so on the
ground that extremely speculative and improbable outcomes do not deserve attention.182
So far, then, Harsanyi’s criticism of maximin seems on firm ground.
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But something important is missing from Harsanyi’s argument and even from the
reporter’s analysis of the choice between Los Angeles and Paris: Risks, and equally bad
worst-case scenarios, are on all sides of the hypothesized situations. If the reporter stayed
in Los Angeles, he might be killed in one way or another, and hence the use of maximin
does not by itself justify the decision to stay in the United States. And contrary to
Harsanyi’s argument, maximin does not really mean that people should not cross streets,
drive over bridges, and refuse to marry. The reason is that failing to do those three things
has worst-case scenarios of its own (including death and disaster). To implement
maximin, or an injunction to take precautions, it is necessary to identify all relevant risks,
not a subset. Harsanyi errs in the same way as do those who embrace the strong version
of the Precautionary Principle, by neglecting the possibility that precautions against one
set of risks will create risks of its own. Alternative decisions may lead to worst-case
scenarios that are very bad and even equally bad. A Catastrophic Harm Precautionary
Principle, attempting to eliminate the worst cases, might produce nightmarish scenarios
too.
Nonetheless, the more general objection to maximin holds under circumstances of
risk. If probabilities can be assigned to the various outcomes, it does not make sense to
follow maximin when the worst case is highly improbable and when the alternative
option is both much better and much more likely. Of course many people are risk-averse,
or averse to particular risks. But when probabilities can be assigned, maximin seems to
require infinite risk aversion.183 It follows that the reporter would do well to reject
maximin, and to go to Paris, even if the worst-case scenario for Paris is worse than that
for Los Angeles if the realistically likely outcomes are so much better in Paris. These
points are not meant to suggest that in order to be rational, the reporter must calculate
expected values, multiplying imaginable outcomes by probability and deciding
accordingly. Life is short; people are busy and occasionally risk-averse; and it is far from
irrational to create a margin of safety to protect against disaster. But if the likelihood of a
bad outcome is extremely small, and if much is to be gained by deciding in accordance
with expected values, maximin is foolish.
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For environmental policy, the implication is clear. A Catastrophic Harm
Precautionary Principle makes sense if it emphasizes expected value; it may even make
sense if it embodies a form of risk aversion. But it does not make sense, as a general rule,
to identify the worst-case scenario and to attempt to eliminate it. But the problem of
uncertainty raises distinctive questions.
F. Maximin and Uncertainty
1. Precautions, uncertainty, and worst case scenarios. I have suggested that
maximin has sometimes been recommended under circumstances of uncertainty rather
than risk.184 In an illuminating effort to recast the Precautionary Principle,185 Stephen
Gardiner invokes John Rawls’s argument for maximin in the context of distributive
justice.
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Rawls argues that when “grave risks” are involved, and when probabilities

cannot be assigned to the occurrence of those risks, maximin is the appropriate decision
rule, at least if the chooser “cares very little, if anything, for what he might gain among
the minimum stipend that he can, in fact, be sure of by following the maximin rule.”187
Rawls contends, then, that maximin is justified (1) in the face of potentially catastrophic
outcomes, (2) where probabilities cannot be assigned ,and (3) where the loss, from
following maximin, is a matter of relative indifference.188 Gardiner argues that this
argument forms the basis for a “core” Precautionary Principle in the environmental
setting. When the three conditions are met, precautions, in the form of efforts to avoid the
worst-case scenario, should be adopted.
Gardiner adds, sensibly, that to justify maximin, the threats that are potentially
catastrophic must satisfy some minimal threshold of plausibility. If they can be dismissed
as unrealistic, then maximin should not be followed. Gardiner believes that the problem
of global warming can be usefully analyzed in these terms and that it presents a good case
for the application of maximin. In a similar vein, Jon Elster, speaking of nuclear power,
contends that maximin is the appropriate choice when it is possible to identify the worst184
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case scenario and when the alternatives have the same best consequences.189 Here, then,
is the basic argument in favor of the most aggressive form of the Catastrophic Harm
Precautionary Principle—a principle that calls on regulators, under circumstances of
uncertainty, to identify and eliminate the worst-case scenario. Taken seriously, this
principle would have large consequences for regulatory policy, at least if conditions of
uncertainty are common.
2. Objection 1: The argument is trivial. An initial problem with this argument is
that it risks triviality, above all because of condition (3).190 If individuals and societies
can eliminate an uncertain danger of catastrophe for essentially no cost, then of course
they should eliminate that risk. If people are asked to pay $1 to avoid a potentially
catastrophic risk to which probabilities cannot be assigned, they might as well pay $1.
And if two options have the same best-case scenario, and if the first has a far better
worst-case scenario, people should of course choose the first option.
There is nothing wrong with this argument, but the real world rarely presents
problems of this form. Where policy and law are disputed, the elimination of uncertain
dangers of catastrophe imposes both costs and risks. In the context of global warming, for
example, it is implausible to say that regulatory choosers can or should care “very little, if
anything,” for what might be lost by following maximin. If nations followed maximin for
global warming, they would spend a great deal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.191
The result would almost certainly be higher prices for gasoline and energy, probably
producing increases in unemployment and poverty. A study done at the Wharton School,
for example, projected extremely high costs for the United States from the Kyoto
Protocol192—including a loss of 2.4 million jobs and $300 billion in the nation’s GDP,
with an average annual cost of $2700 per household, a 65 cent per gallon increase in the
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price of gasoline, and a near-doubling of the price of energy and electricity.193 Even if
these figures are wildly inflated, as seems likely, any significant effort to curtail global
warming would impose significant hardships, especially on poor people, who are least
able to bear the relevant cost increases. Something similar can be said about genetic
modification of food, because elimination of the worst-case scenario, through aggressive
regulation, might well eliminate an inexpensive source of nutrition that would have
exceptionally valuable effects on countless people who lives under circumstances of
extreme deprivation.194
The real question, then, is whether regulators should embrace maximin in realworld cases in which doing so is extremely costly. If they should, it is because condition
(3) is too stringent and should be abandoned. Even if the costs of following maximin are
significant, and even if regulators care a great deal about incurring those costs, the
question is whether it makes sense to follow maximin when they face uncertain dangers
of catastrophe. In the environmental context, some people have so claimed.195 This claim
takes us directly to the next objection to maximin.
3. Objection 2: Maximin assumes infinite risk aversion. Rawls’ arguments in
favor of adopting maximin, for purposes of distributive justice, were subject to withering
critiques from economists.196 The central challenge was that the maximin principle would
be chosen by those maximizing expected utility only if they showed infinite risk aversion.
In the words of one of Rawls’ most influential critics, infinite risk aversion “is unlikely.
Even though the stakes are great, people may well wish to trade a reduction in the assured
floor against the provision of larger gains. But if risk aversion is less than infinite, the
outcome will not be maximin.”197 To adapt this objection to the environmental context:
It is plausible to assume a bounded degree of risk aversion with respect to catastrophic
harms, to support some modest forms of the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle.
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But even under circumstances of uncertainty—the argument goes—maximin is senseless
unless societies are to show infinite risk aversion.
This is a standard challenge, but it is wrong, because maximin does not assume
infinite risk aversion.198 Suppose that people are in circumstances of genuine uncertainty,
that is Knightian uncertainty, in which probabilities cannot plausibly be assigned to
various outcomes.199 The objection that maximin assumes infinite risk aversion depends
on a denial that uncertainty exists; it assumes that subjective choices will be made and
that they will reveal subjective probabilities. It is true that subjective choices will be
made. But such choices do not establish that objective uncertainty does not exist. To see
why, it is necessary to engage that question directly.
3. Objection 3: Uncertainty does not exist. Many economists have denied the
existence of uncertainty. Milton Friedman, for example, writes of the risk-uncertainty
distinction that “I have not referred to this distinction because I do not believe it is valid. I
follow L.J. Savage in his view of personal probability, which denies any valid distinction
along these lines. We may treat people as if they assigned numerical probabilities to
every conceivable event.”200 Friedman and other skeptics are correct to insist that
people’s choices suggest that they assign probabilities to events.201 On a widespread
view, an understanding of people’s choices can be taken as evidence of subjective
probabilities. People’s decisions about whether to fly or instead to drive, whether to walk
in certain neighborhoods at life, and whether to take risky jobs can be understood as an
implicit assignment of probabilities to events. Indeed, regulators themselves make
decisions, including decisions about global warming, from which subjective probabilities
198
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can be calculated.202 But none of this makes for a good objection to Knight, who was
concerned with objective probabilities rather than subjective choices.203 Animals, no less
than human beings, make choices from which subjective probabilities can be assigned.
But the existence of subjective probabilities—from dogs, horses, and elephants—does not
mean that animals do not ever face genuine uncertainty.
Suppose that the question is the likelihood that at least one hundred million
human beings will be alive in 10,000 years. For most people, equipped with the
knowledge that they have, no probability can sensibly be assigned. Perhaps uncertainty is
not unbounded; the likelihood can reasonably be described as above 0% and below
100%. But beyond that point, there is little to say. Or suppose that I present you with a
urn, containing 250 balls, and ask you to pick one; if you pick a blue ball, you receive
$1000, but if you pick a green ball, you have to pay me $1000. Suppose that I refuse to
disclose the proportion of blue and green balls in the urn—or suppose that the proportion
has been determined by a computer, which has been programmed by someone that
neither you nor I know. These examples suggest that it is wrong to deny the possible
existence of uncertainty, signaled by the absence of objective probabilities.204
For Friedman and other skeptics about uncertainty, there is an additional problem.
When necessary, human beings do assign subjective probabilities to future events. But
the assignment is a function of how the situation is described, and formally identical
descriptions can produce radically different judgments. There is every reason to believe,
for example, that people will not give the same answer to the question, “what is the
likelihood that 80% of people will suffer an adverse effect from a certain risk?” and to the
question, “what is the likelihood that 20% of people will not suffer an adverse effect from
a certain risk?”205 The merely semantic reframing will almost certainly affect probability
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judgments.206 In any case probability judgments are notoriously unreliable, based as they
frequently are on heuristics and biases that lead to severe and systematic errors.207
Suppose that subjective probability estimates are rooted in the availability heuristic,
leading people to exaggerate risks for which examples readily come to mind
(“availability bias”) and also to underestimate risks for which examples are cognitive
unavailable (“unavailability bias”).208 Why should regulators believe that subjective
estimates, subject as they are framing, heuristics, and biases, have any standing in the
face of the objective difficulty or impossibility of making probability judgments?
Suppose that Judge Posner is correct to believe that with respect to global warming, it is
objectively impossible to assign a probability to the risk of catastrophic harm.209 Even if
individuals and governments assign subjective probabilities, how does their assignment
bear on what ought to be done?
Writing in 1937, Keynes, often taken to be a critic of the idea of uncertainty,
clearly saw the distinction between objective probabilities and actual behavior: “The
sense in which I am using the term [‘uncertain’ knowledge] is that in which the prospect
of a European war is uncertain . . . . About these matters there is no scientific basis on
which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know.”210 This is
so even if, as Keynes immediately added, we act “exactly as we should if we had behind
us a good Benthamite calculation of a series of prospective advantages and
disadvantages, each multiplied by its appropriate probability, waiting to be summed.”211
Even if subjective expected utilities can be assigned on the basis of behavior, regulators
(like everyone else) may well be operating in circumstances of genuine uncertainty.
4. Objection 4: Uncertainty is too infrequent to be a genuine source of concern
for purposes of policy and law. Perhaps environmental problems rarely involve genuine
206
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uncertainty. Perhaps regulators are usually able to assign probabilities to outcomes; and if
if not, perhaps they can assign probabilities to probabilities (or, if this proves impossible,
probabilities to probabilities of probabilities). In many cases regulators might be able to
specify a range of probabilities—saying, for example, that the probability of catastrophic
outcomes from global warming is above 2% but below 30%.212 Many scientists and
economists believe that global warming is not likely to create catastrophic harm, and that
the real costs, human and economic, will be high but not intolerable. In their view, the
worst-case scenarios can be responsibly described as improbable.213
Perhaps we can agree that pure uncertainty is rare. Perhaps we can agree that at
worst, environmental problems involve problems of “bounded uncertainty,” in which we
cannot assign probabilities within specified bands. It is possible to think, for example,
that the risk of a catastrophic outcome is above 1% but below 10%, without being able to
assign probabilities within that band. The pervasiveness of uncertainty depends on what
is actually known. As I have emphasized, Posner believes that “no probabilities can be
attached to the catastrophic global-warming scenarios, and without an estimate of
probabilities an expected cost cannot be calculated.”214 Note in this regard that a 1994
survey of experts showed an extraordinary range of estimated losses from global
warming, varying from no economic loss to a 20% decrease in gross world product.215
This finding, it has been suggested, is enough to support the view that uncertainty is real
and must be taken seriously in environmental policy.216 In my view, uncertainty is both
real and rare in the environmental domain; but this is an empirical judgment, and it may
be wrong.
5. On maximin, rationality, and genuine uncertainty. Now turn to the most
difficult question: What is the appropriate approach to genuine uncertainty? Is maximin a
rational strategy? I begin with some points about actual behavior and then turn to
normative issues.
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(a) Actual decisions. As a descriptive matter, it is clear that people sometimes
show a degree of uncertainty aversion, in the sense that they will avoid gambles to which
probabilities are not assigned. The relevant work was done by Daniel Ellsberg.217 Assume
that people are asked to choose among two lotteries, each involving an urn with 100
balls. All of the balls are either black or red. For the first lottery, the urn contains an equal
division of black and red balls. For the second lottery, the urn contains an unknown
proportion of black balls and red balls. People receive a specified amount of money for
correctly guessing the color of balls randomly chosen from the urn. It turns out that most
people prefer the first lottery to the second, and thus display aversion to uncertainty.218
On the assumption of uncertainty aversion, it might be possible to defend maximin as a
decision rule.219
Note, however, that uncertainty aversion is bounded. So long as uncertainty
aversion is not infinite, maximin will not always be the preferred decision rule. And
indeed it is reasonable to think that most people will reject maximin if the question is
properly framed. To test this possibility, I asked seventy-one University of Chicago law
students the following problem:
The government is considering two environmental problems. For the first, the
government is able to estimate the probability that a bad outcome will occur. It believes
that there is a 90% chance that 600 people will die (and the death of 500 people is the
worst-case scenario). It also believes that there is a 10% chance that 400 people will die.
For the second problem, the government cannot assign probabilities to the various
outcomes. The “worst-case scenario” is that 700 people will die.
Do you think:
(a) the first problem has higher priority?
(b) the second problem has higher priority?
(c) the two problems have equal priority?
No fewer than 63% chose (a), with the remainder equally divided between (b) and
(c). As noted above, law students at any particular institution may offer idiosyncratic
responses to such questions; but within the general population, it is reasonable to
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conjecture that most people will show no consistent preference for maximin, and that
they will reject an approach that eliminates the worst worst-case scenario, under
circumstances of uncertainty, in favor of an approach that eliminates a highly probable
but somewhat less bad worst-case scenario.
Why is this? The Principle of Insufficient Reason says that when people lack
information about probabilities (say, 1% to 40%), they should act as if each probability is
equally likely.220 Whatever its normative status,221 actual decisions may well use that
principle, which fits well with the results in the experiment just described. Consider
another experiment with a larger group of law students from two institutions (the
University of Alabama and the University of Chicago222):
One thousand people are at risk from an environmental hazard. (a) If one
approach is taken, a minimum of 400 people will die, and a maximum of 500 people will
die. Regulators are unable to assign probabilities to the various outcomes. (b) If another
approach is taken, a minimum of 10 people will die, and a maximum of 600 people will
die. Regulators are unable to assign probabilities to the various outcomes. Which
approach should be chosen?
(a) The first approach
(b) The second approach
No less than 85.5% of respondents rejected maximin and chose (b). Why did (b)
seem better to so many respondents? On a reasonable interpretation, people begin by
presuming at least roughly equal probabilities under circumstances of uncertainty, and
conclude that they would much rather go the route that has a much higher expected value,
given that presumption. This interpretation is supported by the results of the following
experiment,223 which asks people to compare a choice under risk with a choice under
uncertainty:
The government is considering two environmental problems. For the first, the
government is able to estimate the probability that a bad outcome will occur. It believes
that there is a 60% chance that 500-600 people will die (and the death of 600 people is
220
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the worst-case scenario). It also believes that there is a 40% chance that 200-400 people
will die. For the second problem, the government cannot assign probabilities to the
various outcomes. The worst-case scenario is that 700 people will die.
Do you think:
(a)
(b)
(c)

the first problem has higher priority?
the second problem has higher priority?
the two problems have equal priority?

For this problem, maximin was also rejected by a majority of respondents, but
here the margin was much thinner: 52% favored (a), 25% were undecided, and 22%
favored (b). The rejection of maximin is the most striking result here, and it is not entirely
clear why the choice seemed relatively difficult. But the Principle of Insufficient Reason
is consistent with that difficulty. Under the second problem, the expected number of
deaths is 350 is equal probabilities are assigned, a number that is close to the expected
number of deaths for the first problem; with a small degree of risk aversion, the choice
between the two problems becomes extremely difficult.
To see the role of the Principle of Insufficient Reason, suppose that people are
asked to choose between:
a)
b)

a 99.5% chance of a loss of 200 lives, and a .5% chance of a loss of 2
lives, with
an uncertain chance of losing between 2 lives and 205 lives.

For most people, it is reasonable to suppose that a) is much worse than b)—and
hence that b) will be the overwhelming choice. Here, then, people will select a choice that
eliminate the worst-case scenario. But compare:
c)
d)

a risk of 60% of a loss of 200 lives, and 40% of 2 lives, with
an uncertain chance of losing between 205 lives and 2 lives.

For most people, the choice here is much less clear, and it is likely that many
people will choose c) and refuse to follow maximin. It follows that people would have a
great deal of difficulty in choosing between a 51% risk of a loss of 200 lives, and a 49%
chance of a loss of 1 life, as compared with an uncertain risk that threatens to produce
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losses of between 200 and 1 lives, with no possibility of assigning probabilities to the
various possibilities.
The precise role of the Principle of Insufficient Reason, and the nature of people’s
choices under circumstances of uncertainty, remain to be established. The discussion thus
far should be enough to show that people will often reject maximin and that the Principle
of Insufficient Reason is a starting point for their intuitions. The implication for
environmental protection, and for other problems involving safety and health, is clear.
People will not consistently follow maximin under circumstances of uncertainty. If the
worst-case scenario is extremely vivid, and if it is drawn to their attention, they might
neglect the issue of probability and attempt to eliminate it.224 But under ordinary
circumstances, they will select maximin only when the Principle of Insufficient Reason,
accompanied by a degree of risk aversion, suggests that they should.
(b) A cost-benefit analysis of maximin? A great deal of work explores the question
whether people should follow maximin under circumstances of uncertainty.225 Some of
this work draws on people’s intuitions, in a way that illuminates actual beliefs but may
tell us little about what rationality requires.226 Those intuitions, of the sort described by
the experiments above, may be based on some kind of confusion. Other work is highly
formal,
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adopting certain axioms and seeing whether maximin violates them. The

results of this work are not conclusive.228 Certainly maximin has not been ruled out as a
candidate for rational choice under uncertainty.
I cannot resolve these difficult issues here, but will rest content with a general
suggestion. In deciding whether to follow maximin in the environmental context, a great
deal should turn on two questions: (a) How bad is the worst-case scenario, compared to
other bad outcomes? (b) What, exactly, is lost by choosing maximin? Of course it is
possible that choosers, including regulators, will lack the information that would enable
224
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them to answer these questions. But in the regulatory context, answers to both (a) and (b)
may well be possible even if it is not possible to assign probabilities to the various
outcomes with any confidence. By emphasizing the relative badness of the worst-case
scenario, and the extent of the loss from attending to it, I am attempting to build on the
Rawls/Gardiner suggestion that maximin is the preferred decision rule when little is lost
from following it. I have objected that this suggestion threatens to trivialize the case for
maximin; but it is possible to develop the underlying intuition into a far more general,
and useful, method for orienting both private and public choice.
To see the relevance of the two questions, suppose that you are choosing between
two options. The first has a best-case outcome of 10 and a worst-case outcome of –5. The
second has a best-case outcome of 15 and a worst-case outcome of –6. It is impossible to
assign probabilities to the various outcomes. Maximin would favor the first option, to
avoid the worse worst-case; but to justify that choice, we have to know something about
the meaning of the difference s between 10 and 15 on the one hand and –5 and –6 on the
other. If 15 is much better than 10, and if the difference between –5 and –6 is a matter of
relative indifference, then the choice of the first option is hardly mandated. But if the
difference between –5 and –6 greatly matters—if it is a matter of life and death—then
maximin is much more attractive.
These points have the important implication of suggesting the possibility of a
(rough) cost-benefit analysis229 of maximin under conditions of uncertainty. Sometimes a
rejection of maximin is compelled by that analysis because the worst-case scenario is not
much worse than the second worst-case scenario (and hence the benefits of maximin are
low),and because maximin imposes extremely high costs.230 But sometimes the worst229
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case is the worst by far, and sometimes we lose relatively little by choosing maximin. It is
typically thought necessary to assign probabilities in order to engage in cost-benefit
balancing; without an understanding of probabilities, such balancing might not seem able
to get off the ground.231 But a useful form of cost-benefit balancing is possible even
without reliable information about probability. For the balancing exercise to work, of
course, it must be possible to produce cardinal rankings among the outcomes—that is, it
must be possible to rank them not merely in terms of their badness but also in at least
rough terms of how much worse each is than the less-bad others. That approach will not
work if cardinal rankings are not feasible—as might be the case if (for example) it is not
easy to compare the catastrophic loss from global warming with the loss from huge
expenditures on reductions of greenhouse gas emissions. Much of the time, however,
cardinal rankings are possible.
Irreversibility becomes highly relevant as part of this analysis. Recall that some of
the costs of precautions are irreversible. If governments invest a great deal to control
greenhouse gas emissions, they will be forcing private and public actors to incur
irreversible costs. It follows that if governments follow maximin, they will be limiting
their own flexibility , expending a great deal even though future information might move
the situation from uncertainty to risk, as regulators learn more about the problem.
Suppose that no probability can now be assigned to the catastrophic risk associated with
abrupt global warming, and that for this reason regulators are tempted to spend a great
deal to eliminate that risk. The relevant expenditures will greatly reduce future flexibility,
ensuring sunk costs for a danger that might turn out to be quantifiable or even trivial.
This point is not decisive against large expenditures, but it should be part of the analysis
of whether worst-case scenarios ought to be eliminated. In this sense, there can be some
tension between an Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle and a Catastrophic Harm
Precautionary Principle.
Imagine, then, two polar situations with respect to global warming. First, suppose
that the catastrophic dangers associated with global warming could be eliminated if every
nation contributed $10 million to a fund to combat that risk. On reasonable assumptions,
that cost would be fully acceptable. Second, suppose that the catastrophic dangers
231
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associated with global warming could be eliminated only if every nation contributed
enough resources to reduce standards of living by 50% world-wide, with a corresponding
increase in global poverty. If global warming really does pose an uncertain danger of
total catastrophe, maximin argues in favor of this extraordinary reduction in world-wide
standards of living. But to incur costs of this magnitude, we might want to insist that the
danger of catastrophe rise about the minimal threshold—that there be demonstrable
probability, and a not-so-low one, that the catastrophic risk will occur.
To appreciate this point, and the need for an analysis of the effects of following
maximin, imagine an individual or society lacking the information that would permit the
assignment of probabilities to a series of hazards with catastrophic outcomes; suppose
that the number of hazards is ten, or a twenty, or a thousand. Suppose too that such an
individual or society is able to assign probabilities (ranging from 1% to 90%) to an
equivalent number of other hazards, with outcomes that range from bad to extremely bad,
but never catastrophic. Suppose finally that every one of these hazards can be eliminated
at a cost—a cost that is high, but that does not, once incurred in individual cases, inflict
harms that count as extremely bad or catastrophic. The maximin principle suggests that
our individual or society should spend a great deal to eliminate each of the ten, or twenty,
or hundred potentially catastrophic hazards. But once that amount is spent on even one of
those hazards, there might be nothing left to combat the extremely bad hazards, even
those with a 90% chance of occurring. We could even imagine that a poorly informed
individual or society would be condemned to real poverty and distress, or even worse,
merely by virtue of following maximin. In these circumstances, maximin should be
rejected.
This suggestion derives indirect support from the empirical finding that when
asked to decide on the distribution of goods and services, most people reject the two most
widely discussed principles in the philosophical literature: average utility, favored by
Harsanyi, and Rawls’ difference principle (allowing inequalities only if they work to the
advantage to the least well-off).232 Instead people choose average utility with a floor
constraint—that is, they favor an approach that maximizes overall well-being, but subject
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to the constraint that no member of society may fall below a decent minimum.233
Insisting on an absolute welfare minimum to all, they maximize over that floor. Their
aversion to especially bad outcomes leads them to a pragmatic threshold in the form of
the floor. So too, very plausibly, in the context of precautions against risks. A sensible
individual, or society, would not always choose maximin under circumstances of risk or
uncertainty. Everything depends on what is lost, and what is gained, by eliminating the
worst-case scenario; and much of that time, available information makes it possible to
answer those questions at least in general terms.
Nothing here is meant as a proof that maximin is forbidden, or even not required,
by rationality. To decide on the relationship between rationality and maximin strategies,
it is necessary to specify the right account of rationality.234 I am doubtful that any such
specification can establish the status of maximin without making contentious
assumptions. My claim is instead that maximin makes most sense when the worst-case
scenario, under one course of action, is much worse than the worst-case scenario under
the alternative course of action, and when the choice of maximin does not result in
extremely significant losses.
G. Dealing with Catastrophic Risks
The most general conclusion is that a degree of risk aversion should be expected
in cases of catastrophic risks; for such risks, margins of safety are entirely sensible. For
this reason, a Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle, of the sort suggested by several
understandings of the Precautionary Principle, is a coherent and defensible part of
environmental policy.235 Indeed, such a principle might well be the best understanding of
the Precautionary Principle itself. It has many uses, not only in environmental policy but
in health and safety regulation as a whole, including the war on terrorism.
But maximin is not generally a sensible strategy in the environmental context or
elsewhere. First, it is senseless under circumstances of risk, unless we assume an
implausibly high degree of risk aversion. Second, regulators are rarely operating under
circumstances of pure uncertainty; often rough probabilities can be ascribed to serious
233
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outcomes, and if not, at least rough probabilities can be ascribed to probabilities. Third,
adoption of maximin, under circumstances of genuine uncertainty, is most reasonable
when the worst-case scenario is exceptionally bad and when removal of that scenario
does not inflict serious losses of its own.
It follows that a Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle is best understood to
embody a form of risk aversion for the most dangerous risks. Its central domain involves
. uncertain dangers of catastrophe when the costs of reducing those dangers are not huge
and when incurring those costs does not divert substantial resources from extremely
pressing problems. Four qualifications are important:
1. The Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle must be attentive to the full range of
social risks; it makes no sense to take steps to avert catastrophe if those very steps
would create catastrophic risks of their own. If a preventive war, designed to reduce
the risks of terrorism from one source, would increase those very risks from another
source, then the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle is indeterminate. This
point is a simple extension of that made earlier with respect to the unrefined
Precautionary Principle and the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle.
2. Use of the principle should be closely attentive to the idea of cost-effectiveness,
which requires regulators to choose the least costly means of achieving their ends. In
the context of global warming, there are many methods by which to reduce the
relevant risks.236 Both nations and international institutions should choose those
methods that minimize costs. The same is true for efforts to combat terrorism.
3. Here as elsewhere, distributional considerations matter. The principle should be
applied in a way that reduces extreme burdens on those least able to bear them. For
global warming, there is a particular need to ensure that citizens of poor nations are
not required to pay a great deal to contribute to the solution of a problem for which
those in wealthy nations are most responsible.237 If an antiterrorism policy would
impose special burdens on members of racial and religious minority groups—
consider racial profiling—it is worth considering other policies that reduce or
eliminate those burdens.
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4. Costs matter as such. The extent of precautions cannot reasonably be divorced from
their expense. In cases of the kind I am discussing, where the worst-case scenario is
truly catastrophic and when probabilities cannot be assigned, a large margin of safety
makes a great deal of sense.238
There is a final point. It is possible to combine a concern about catastrophe with a
focus on irreversible harm, in a way that generates an Irreversible and Catastrophic Harm
Precautionary Principle. Suppose that by adopting environmental controls at the present
time, regulators can maintain flexibility to prevent a risk that is not only irreversible but
potentially catastrophic as well. Suppose too that the likelihood of catastrophe cannot be
specified with much confidence, or even that it is in the domain of uncertainty rather than
risk. Risk-neutral, risk-averse, or uncertainty-averse regulators might be willing to pay a
great deal to maintain the flexibility that would permit them to avoid the worst-case
scenarios. We have seen that significant expenditures can reduce flexibility too; many
problems involve not irreversibility, but irreversibilities. At the same time, the most
important irreversibilities may well turn out to be environmental in character.
This argument provides the strongest basis for aggressive measures to combat
global warming.239 The natural objections would either point to the irreversible costs of
maintaining flexibility or question the probability that catastrophe will actually ensue.
The appropriate conclusion rests on an assessment of the empirical questions,240 but in
my view, an appreciation of irreversibility and catastrophe argues for otherwise excessive
steps to reduce greenhouse gases.241
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IV.

Rival Rationality Revisited
When it comes to risk, why do experts disagree with ordinary people? Many

people think that the reason lies in the fact that ordinary people have a “rival
rationality.”242 On this view, experts are concerned with statistics, and, above all, with the
number of lives at stake.243 By contrast, ordinary people are concerned with a range of
qualitative factors that make certain risks a special cause of concern. Irreversibility and
catastrophe are said to loom especially large in ordinary people’s reactions.244 Where
experts simply calculate expected values, ordinary people, and lay rationality, show
special aversion to potentially irreversible and catastrophic harm. If this is so, ordinary
people display “rival rationalities,” and each “side must respect the insights and
intelligence of the other.”245
According to a competing view, the rival rationality of ordinary people is mostly a
product of cognitive illusions, ignorance, and confusion.246 For the critics, ordinary
people are also concerned with the central question, which is the number of lives at stake.
Unfortunately, they are unable to answer that question well. When ordinary people show
a concern about irreversible and catastrophic harms, it is because they fear that many
lives are at risk, no less and no more.
The discussion thus far suggests a possible rapprochement between the apparently
rival rationalities. Sensible experts do not and should not believe that there is any
particular magic in irreversibility, and they do and should insist that the line between
catastrophic and non-catastrophic harm is one of degree. But they should also agree that
irreversibility matters, in the sense that it makes sense to spend resources to maintain
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flexibility for the future. Insofar as the National Environmental Policy Act247 instructs
agencies to spend time to acquire relevant information before ensuring irreversible losses,
it is on firm ground. Experts agree that any cost-benefit analysis that ignores option value
is missing an important variable—a standard point in finance though not yet in
environmental protection.248 In this sense, ordinary people are correct to see the
importance of irreversibility, and to emphasize the importance, some of the time, of
adopting a strategy of “act, and then learn.”
What of catastrophic risks? Experts may have little to say on the question whether
it is worse to create a 1/100 risk that 100,000 people will die, or a 1/100,000 risk that 1
million people will die. But they should agree that when regulators are unable to assign
probabilities to catastrophic risks, it is worth doing a great deal to avoid those risks—or at
least to spend resources while more information is acquired. Experts cannot rule out the
choice of maximin under circumstances of uncertainty. At the very least, experts know
that elimination of the worst-case scenario is sometimes justified by a kind of cost-benefit
analysis, one that pays attention to the relative egregiousness of the worst case and the
costs of eliminating it. Sensible experts are interested not only in the expected value of
catastrophic risks, but also in producing strategies for eliminating them when
probabilities cannot be confidently assigned. For these reasons, an understanding of
irreversibility and catastrophe help not only to refine but also to vindicate intuitions that
have been found to play a significant role in ordinary risk perceptions.
Conclusion
The ideas of irreversibility and catastrophe have had a major impact on domestic
and international law, and they play a large role in private and public decisions. My
major goal in this Article is to unpack these ideas and to bring them to bear on law and
policy. I have suggested the possibility of replacing the Precautionary Principle, which is
incoherent, with more refined principles that embody an understanding of the distinctive
problem of irreversible losses and of the need to attend to low-probability risks of
disaster.
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We have seen that an Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle is both plausible
and coherent. Drawing on the idea of real options, it suggests that regulators, including
those who make environmental policy, should find it worthwhile to invest resources to
preserve flexibility for the future. In the context of global warming, the Irreversible Harm
Precautionary Principle argues for substantial current investments, above all because
emissions of carbon dioxide stay in the atmosphere for an extremely long time. The
difficulty here is that emissions reductions also impose irreversible costs. An emphasis on
irreversibility does not always favor aggressive environmental regulation, or anything
like an attitude of “act, then learn.” It is even possible to imagine an Irreversible Harm
Precautionary Principle that in many cases argues for a plan of “wait and learn.”249
Everything depends on the magnitude and likelihood of the full range of irreversible
losses. In the context of global warming, the best approach is probably a world-wide
agreement to cap greenhouse emissions, with the size of the cap decreasing over time as
the expense of controls diminish.250
If expected values matter, then societies should not ignore low probability risks of
catastrophe. A minimal response would be a Catastrophe Harm Precautionary Principle,
one that attempts to counteract the serious risk that both individuals and societies will
treat small risks as if there were zero.251 The argument for this principle is strengthened
by the fact that a catastrophic harm typically has secondary effects that ensure adverse
effects that go far beyond a simple multiple of the number of people who are killed.252 A
less minimal approach would build a degree of risk aversion into the Catastrophe Harm
Precautionary Principle, so as to treat catastrophic harms as worth more than their
expected value. A much more aggressive approach would be to adopt maximin, by which
regulators identify the worst-case scenario and attempt to eliminate it. I have argued that
for most environmental problems, this approach is senseless. Under circumstances of
risk, maximin is far too cautious, and it would inflict serious harms—often including
environmental harms—for no sufficient reason. Usually environmental problems involve
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risk, in the sense that a range of probabilities can be assigned, or at least in the sense that
probabilities can be assigned to probabilities.
As a matter of theory, pure uncertainty cannot be ruled out of bounds. The fact
that people assign probabilities to uncertain outcomes does not negate the possibility of
(objective) uncertainty. Under circumstances of uncertainty, maximin has some appeal if
the worst-case scenario is truly catastrophic. And if it is not terribly costly to eliminate
that scenario, regulators should certainly do so. But maximin can be an unappealing
strategy, certainly under risk, and also when the worst-case scenario is not much worse
than the second-worst case scenario and when the costs of eliminating the worst-case
scenario are extremely high. To operate sensibly, precautionary steps must be attentive to
the full range of consequences, not simply to a subset of them. But a Catastrophic Harm
Precautionary Principle, applied with a wide viewscreen, has an important role in
environmental law as well as ordinary life,253 and it is a strong candidate for replacing
and refining any more general Precautionary Principle.
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